Today is one of my personal holidays. This has nothing to do with Labor Day, but with the Franco-Prussian War. That war has much to say to us today, and ahs been a topic of personal interest for several years.
There are two quality histories. The best is 'The Franco-Prussian War', by Michael Howard. Almost as good, and with a different perspective, is 'The Franco-Prussian War' by Jeffrey Wawro. My experience is almost no one knows anything about this conflict, and so a very brief synopsis.
France was the leading military power of the world in 1870. The French suppression of Algeria and Libya combined with the legacy of Napoleon I gave France an aura of military invincibility. Their draft, supply and artillery, however, were all either outmoded or horribly corrupt. Prussia had an old tradition of military excellence from Frederick the Great, but had been humbled by Napoleon and was a state without natural borders and diplomatically defensive. Their fight with Austria in 1866 was given little notice, despite the fact they had destroyed the Austrians in a matter of a couple of months. The Prussians applied the lessons of that war to radically upgrade their artillery, to lay many miles of railways for supply, and had instituted universal conscription without exemption or social consideration.
This had produced an odd experience for the Prussians. Military service was a great social leavener, much as it was for the US in the '50s. It was an obligation for all men, regardless of education or wealth. In France a substitute could be paid to serve in the army for a man, and it was rare that educated or wealthy men served. Despite its international reputation the army in France was despised as a haven for the stupid and the drunk. And it was. Efforts at reform had run into great political resistance, and the supply system was unorganized. Their railways were single track, requiring empty trains to travel all the way back to depots before another full one could go out, in contrast to the money spent by Prussia for double tracked lines.
The war began with the Hohenzollern candidacy. Prussia had been ruled by the Hohenzollerns for more than two hundred years, the French by republics or the Bourbons for 800. A minor Hohenzollern prince was put forward by a third party without Hohenzollern knowledge or approval for the vacant throne of Spain. Both governments, needing war for different reasons, fanned the upset. The French felt threatened , and strongly objected to the nomination. The Hohenzollern family withdrew it, themselves not favorable to the idea. The French, however, demanded not simply an apology but an abject statement from the Prussian King that he would never seek further territory or put forward a Hohenzollern candidate for a throne. This demand was presented to the King by the French foreign minister at Bad Ems, where both were taking a July holiday. The Prussians were outraged, the French were outraged, and France declared war on July 15. Now comes the fun.
Having declared war, it was assumed the French had both the force and plan to prosecute it. Except they didn't. By July 28 they had less than 100,000 men at the frontier. Divisions arrived with guns but no bullets, tents but no food, no hospital supplies, inadequate horse fodder and no maps. Meanwhile the Prussians had quietly and efficiently concentrated 300,000 men, with a plan for a three pronged invasive response to the French. The French managed to put together 160,000 men by July 31, when they 'took' Saarbrucken. Two days later they had to leave, as the town was surrounded by hills occupied by Prussians. From here things rapidly fell apart.
A series of engagements took place, all of which the French lost. The Prussian columns moved so rapidly that they were crossing the Meuse south of Metz before the French had even reached the river. There was thus the paradox of Prussian attacks coming not from the east but from the west. At Mars-la-Tour on August 16 the Prussians closed the road from Metz to Verdun and Paris, and 2 days later at Gravellote-St.Privat they inflicted a defeat that forced the French into the fortress of Metz, where they were surrounded and besieged. The Prussians had 1 million reservists fully trained, who were pouring into line, and they left a force to invest Metz and went after the rest of the French army, now made up in part of ill-trained reservists. They fought at Beaumont as the French struggled to find safety, and then at Sedan. Here the French again sought the safety of hills and forts but were again surrounded by a force nearly double their own. And on September 2 they surrendered. the entire French professional army had been destroyed or imprisoned in 6 weeks. The war dragged on for another 8 months as the Prussians besieged Paris and suppressed poorly trained French reserves in the countryside.
The negotiated peace was crushing. The German Empire was declared in the hall of Mirrors at Versailles on January 18, 1871. A German occupying army, housed and fed at French expense, was to be in place until France paid off the war debt, a staggering 5 Billion Francs, double the entrie GDP of France in 1870. It is the equivalent of asking the US to pay 60 billion dollars today. Worst of all, Most of Alsace and a part of Lorraine were ceded. This was quite controversial. In earlier wars it was common for territory to be traded, but less so by 1870. The German military insisted upon it for strategic reasons, to weaken the border of France. Bismarck was opposed, wanting a victory to create a German Empire, which it did, not an implacable enemy, which was created by the territorial cession. France thought of and planned for nothing except Revanche for 44 years, until the outbreak of WW 1.
September 2 is the day that made all this possible. And Michael Howard argues convincingly that the peace of 1870 shaped the next 70-100 years. The consequences-
-the rage of the French in WW 1.
-the peace of Versailles, a grossly unfair treaty, which in turn led to-
-German rage
-Hitler
-WW 2
-the boundaries of the Middle East and the resultant 100 years of strife there
-the Great Depression, arising when Germany could not pay their War Debt on demand after
a bank failure
It has seemed to me then that September 2 is a kind of political and military 'day of atonement' and reflection. For me, the lessons of the War of 1870 are-
-don't fight except for proximate threat
-honor, status and social causes mean nothing when considering war
-be fair in allocating military service to all
-be honest when assessing social problems, as the French were not prior to 1870
-don't seek revenge or 'permanent safety' in peace. It is essential to be kind and just, but never more
so than when you are right or a victor
Think about those lessons. How many are we violating today? All of them. We learn nothing from history, and are truly condemned to repeat it. The France of 1870 is the US of today, a power of great reputation but less capable and less prosperous than would appear. I fear we will enter a conflict for foolish reasons and end up stunningly defeated, with secondary but severe social consequences.
Ted
There are two quality histories. The best is 'The Franco-Prussian War', by Michael Howard. Almost as good, and with a different perspective, is 'The Franco-Prussian War' by Jeffrey Wawro. My experience is almost no one knows anything about this conflict, and so a very brief synopsis.
France was the leading military power of the world in 1870. The French suppression of Algeria and Libya combined with the legacy of Napoleon I gave France an aura of military invincibility. Their draft, supply and artillery, however, were all either outmoded or horribly corrupt. Prussia had an old tradition of military excellence from Frederick the Great, but had been humbled by Napoleon and was a state without natural borders and diplomatically defensive. Their fight with Austria in 1866 was given little notice, despite the fact they had destroyed the Austrians in a matter of a couple of months. The Prussians applied the lessons of that war to radically upgrade their artillery, to lay many miles of railways for supply, and had instituted universal conscription without exemption or social consideration.
This had produced an odd experience for the Prussians. Military service was a great social leavener, much as it was for the US in the '50s. It was an obligation for all men, regardless of education or wealth. In France a substitute could be paid to serve in the army for a man, and it was rare that educated or wealthy men served. Despite its international reputation the army in France was despised as a haven for the stupid and the drunk. And it was. Efforts at reform had run into great political resistance, and the supply system was unorganized. Their railways were single track, requiring empty trains to travel all the way back to depots before another full one could go out, in contrast to the money spent by Prussia for double tracked lines.
The war began with the Hohenzollern candidacy. Prussia had been ruled by the Hohenzollerns for more than two hundred years, the French by republics or the Bourbons for 800. A minor Hohenzollern prince was put forward by a third party without Hohenzollern knowledge or approval for the vacant throne of Spain. Both governments, needing war for different reasons, fanned the upset. The French felt threatened , and strongly objected to the nomination. The Hohenzollern family withdrew it, themselves not favorable to the idea. The French, however, demanded not simply an apology but an abject statement from the Prussian King that he would never seek further territory or put forward a Hohenzollern candidate for a throne. This demand was presented to the King by the French foreign minister at Bad Ems, where both were taking a July holiday. The Prussians were outraged, the French were outraged, and France declared war on July 15. Now comes the fun.
Having declared war, it was assumed the French had both the force and plan to prosecute it. Except they didn't. By July 28 they had less than 100,000 men at the frontier. Divisions arrived with guns but no bullets, tents but no food, no hospital supplies, inadequate horse fodder and no maps. Meanwhile the Prussians had quietly and efficiently concentrated 300,000 men, with a plan for a three pronged invasive response to the French. The French managed to put together 160,000 men by July 31, when they 'took' Saarbrucken. Two days later they had to leave, as the town was surrounded by hills occupied by Prussians. From here things rapidly fell apart.
A series of engagements took place, all of which the French lost. The Prussian columns moved so rapidly that they were crossing the Meuse south of Metz before the French had even reached the river. There was thus the paradox of Prussian attacks coming not from the east but from the west. At Mars-la-Tour on August 16 the Prussians closed the road from Metz to Verdun and Paris, and 2 days later at Gravellote-St.Privat they inflicted a defeat that forced the French into the fortress of Metz, where they were surrounded and besieged. The Prussians had 1 million reservists fully trained, who were pouring into line, and they left a force to invest Metz and went after the rest of the French army, now made up in part of ill-trained reservists. They fought at Beaumont as the French struggled to find safety, and then at Sedan. Here the French again sought the safety of hills and forts but were again surrounded by a force nearly double their own. And on September 2 they surrendered. the entire French professional army had been destroyed or imprisoned in 6 weeks. The war dragged on for another 8 months as the Prussians besieged Paris and suppressed poorly trained French reserves in the countryside.
The negotiated peace was crushing. The German Empire was declared in the hall of Mirrors at Versailles on January 18, 1871. A German occupying army, housed and fed at French expense, was to be in place until France paid off the war debt, a staggering 5 Billion Francs, double the entrie GDP of France in 1870. It is the equivalent of asking the US to pay 60 billion dollars today. Worst of all, Most of Alsace and a part of Lorraine were ceded. This was quite controversial. In earlier wars it was common for territory to be traded, but less so by 1870. The German military insisted upon it for strategic reasons, to weaken the border of France. Bismarck was opposed, wanting a victory to create a German Empire, which it did, not an implacable enemy, which was created by the territorial cession. France thought of and planned for nothing except Revanche for 44 years, until the outbreak of WW 1.
September 2 is the day that made all this possible. And Michael Howard argues convincingly that the peace of 1870 shaped the next 70-100 years. The consequences-
-the rage of the French in WW 1.
-the peace of Versailles, a grossly unfair treaty, which in turn led to-
-German rage
-Hitler
-WW 2
-the boundaries of the Middle East and the resultant 100 years of strife there
-the Great Depression, arising when Germany could not pay their War Debt on demand after
a bank failure
It has seemed to me then that September 2 is a kind of political and military 'day of atonement' and reflection. For me, the lessons of the War of 1870 are-
-don't fight except for proximate threat
-honor, status and social causes mean nothing when considering war
-be fair in allocating military service to all
-be honest when assessing social problems, as the French were not prior to 1870
-don't seek revenge or 'permanent safety' in peace. It is essential to be kind and just, but never more
so than when you are right or a victor
Think about those lessons. How many are we violating today? All of them. We learn nothing from history, and are truly condemned to repeat it. The France of 1870 is the US of today, a power of great reputation but less capable and less prosperous than would appear. I fear we will enter a conflict for foolish reasons and end up stunningly defeated, with secondary but severe social consequences.
Ted
A nice analogy and good points for comparison. It makes for sobering reflection.
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